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Abstract 
The article establishes the analytical framework of incentive mechanism and the rank order tournaments model that 
based on the relative performance for developing energy-saving and emission reduction by using the theory of 
principle-agent and the Malcomson model.  We systematically analyzes the model, and proposes the corresponding 
policy suggestions. 
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1. Introduction 
With the acceleration of industrialization process, socializat ion large production based on technology 
and machine brings great wealth to mankind, but consumes many fossil resources and weakens carrying 
capacity of environmental. All countries in the world start moral reflection on impact ion of economic 
development to nature, and realize that energy-saving and emission reduction is best plan of solving the 
conflicts among environment, resources and economic development. The development goal of enterprises 
in China usually focused on reducing costs, increas ing production or pursuing maximize profits, and 
seldom consider the effect ive utilizat ion of resources. The current  research literatures main focus on how 
to improve energy-saving and emission reduction policy supporting, Wu Liya(2003) proposed that 
government should levy the production tax for monopoly industries  and modify the external diseconomies 
of natural monopolies  through intervention[1]; Shi Jianhua (2004) studied the financial and tax policy of 
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promoting energy-saving and emission reduction[2]; Ni Hongri (2005) suggested that gradually raise the 
rate of consumption tax on petrol, o r levy ext ra petrol tax in order to raise energy price gradually[3]. 
Research literatures on the incentive mechanism for energy saving and emission reduction is still quite 
inadequate. Therefore, the writer establishes the analytical framework of incentive mechanism and the 
rank order tournaments  model that based on the relative performance for developing energy saving and 
emission reduction by using the theory of principle-agent and the Malcomson model, and systematically 
analyzes the model, finally want to provide the corresponding theory basis . 
2. Model construction on incentive mechanism of enterprises’ energy-saving and emission reduction.  
Rank order tournaments that based on the relative performance exp lains the principal-agent theory 
from the angle of competition, In the rank order tournaments mechanism, each agent’s income is only 
relate with the sequence, and is not direct ly related to degree of absolute effort. m agents have m prize 
wi(i=1,2,Ăm),w1≥w2≥Ă≥wm, the agents with the best performance receives w1, the second agents 
receives w2, the last one receives wm, and so on. The article establishes the incentives mechanism model 
on enterprises’ energy-saving and emission reduction based on this idea and research literature [4-5]. 
2.1 Principal-agent relationship on energy-saving and emission reduction incentive 
Principal-agent relat ionship is a contractual relationship that Principal entrust agents to complete some 
work and corresponding granted some decision-making power to the agents . Principal is granting side, the 
agent is the action side. But in the principal-agent relationship, it is possible that principal does not keep 
the contract promises , principal also has a "moral hazard." If there is a rank order tournament which 
means a certain proportion of agents will obtain a higher return, then the dominant choice of the principal 
will be pay the higher return to an agent of the higher performance, because it promotes agents to work 
hard. The dominant strategy of agent will also be work hard to strengthen incentives. For the principal-
agent problem on energy-saving and emission reduction, the agent is incentive target, namely  enterprises; 
the principal is incentive main, namely government.  
2.2 Construction of incentive model on enterprises’ energy-saving and emission reduction 
2.2.1 Model assumptions 
ķThere are some many same types of enterprises in a region. 
ĸThe other all are same in addition to method of energy-saving and emission reduction for all 
enterprise, and no game between enterprises . 
ĹIn a certain period, each enterprise can get subsidies policy formulated by the local government on 
energy-saving and emission reduction, the time is divided into two stages, indicated by  t=1,2. 
ĺThe utility function of generated by energy-saving and emission reduction is U(a1, w1,a2,w2),which 
at is expressed as the efforts level of energy-saving and emission reduction in t period, wt is expressed as 
policy or financial support that the government has given enterprise according to efforts effect in t 
period ,Nature assumed that ∂U/∂a=Ua<0, ∂U/∂w=Uw>0, ∂2U/∂a2=Uaa<0, ∂2U/∂w2=Uww<0,. The 
reservation utility of each enterprise is Ū. 
ĻThe utility function on output level of each enterprise’s energy-saving and emission reduction 
observed by government within the region in t period is assumed as:  
πt = at +εtˈt=1,2                                                                                                                      (1) 
πt is the output of each enterprise’s energy-saving and emission reduction observed by government, 
which can use indicators such as carbon emission reduction rate to measure, εt  is a random disturbance 
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that mean be zero, which can be expressed as the government’s observation error to enterprises’ efforts 
level of energy-saving and emission reduction, at is expressed as each enterprise’s  efforts level of energy-
saving and emission reduction. 
ļIt is assumed that F(εt)઼ f(εt) respectively are the distribution function and density function of εt, so 
the distribution function and density function of πt is respectively are  F(πt-at) and  f(πt-at)  if at is set 
down. It  is assumed that whether the government provides support or subsidies for enterprise in the 
region, there is a minimum efforts level a0 of energy-saving and emission reduction, and assuming that a 
minimum efforts level of energy-saving and emission reduction is given as  a> a0, or enterprise will not 
enjoy the preferential policy support of incentives mechanism. 
2.2.2 Construction of Model 
If enterprises can not confirm the output effect πt of energy-saving and emission reduction, the 
incentive contract that the government paying subsidies for enterprise according to πt is unfeasible. 
Because of Ua<0, so fixed subsidies can not encourage enterprises to choose efforts level more than a. As 
follow, the paper will give rank order tournaments based on the relative performance, through which 
encourage enterprises in the region to energy-saving and emission reduction. 
Ł1 - Phase contract designing 
When the efforts level of enterprises’ energy-saving and emission reduction is a≥a, the support or 
subsidies that enterprises will gain is wL  or wH (wL<wH), and the percentage of enterprises that gain 
support or subsidy wH  is P. As long as the percentage of enterprises that gain wH  can be conformed, the 
contract is enforceable. Because πt and at is positive correlation, as long as the enterprise gaining wH  is 
observed as the enterprise that efforts level of energy-saving and emission reduction be large, the 
contracts can encourage enterprises to energy-saving and emission reduction, which  is because that the 
financial budget and policy for energy-saving and emission reduction provided by government is fixed, 
the average support or subsidies that each enterprise within the reg ion expect to is equal to PwH +(1-P)wL, 
the total amount of financial support pay by the government is  nPwH+n(1-P)wL =n[PwH+(1-P)wL], n is 
the total number of enterprises  within the region. So the dominant strategy of government is to pay high 
subsidies for the enterprises of which effect of energy-saving and emission reduction being better.  
The government need formulate a "high performance" standard π* before attract enterprise to take part 
in competition of energy-saving and emission reduction. The government will give enterprises high 
support or subsidies wH under the circumstance of πt ≥ π*, other enterprises will only obtain low support 
or subsidies wL, the probability of enterprises’ performance πt ≥ π* will be 1-F(π*-at) when efforts level 
of energy-saving and emission reduction is at, There is the following formula  when n is enough large     
P=1-F(π*-at)                                                                                                                                 (2) 
ł2 - Phase contract designing 
In the 2 - Phase contract, P percentage of enterprises obtain high support or subsidies wH in the second 
Phase, the other enterprises obtain low-support or subsidies wL. The enterprises will accept the contract 
when only the expected utility is not less than the reservation utility Ū according to participation 
constraint. The enterprises work for w1 in Phase 1 when accept the constraint. They will be special cared 
if the government observed that the output of enterprises efforts as π1 ≥ π*, and enterprises will obtain 
support or subsidy wH in phase 2. Otherwise the enterprises will not be special cared, enterprises will 
obtain support or subsidy wL in phase 2. w  is government reserves support that enterprises not taking part 
in competit ion on energy-saving and emission reduction, let w*2=max{wL, w }. On deciding the efforts 
level a1 of energy-saving and emission reduction in phase 1, the enterprises will obtain support or 
subsidies w*2 in Phase 2 if they can not be special cared. wH >w*2 is naturally  assumed, otherwise the 
special care is meaningless. It is assumed that the phenomenon of special care not occur after the phase 2, 
then a2=a. The expected utility for the enterprise is  
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V(a1,w1,w*2,wH, π*)=F(π*-a1)U(a1,w1,a, w*2)+[1-F(π*-a1)]U(a1,w1,a, wH)                              (3) 
The first term on right end of formula (3) corresponds to the case that enterprises not be special cared, 
the second term on right end corresponds to the case that enterprises be special cared. Enterprises select 
a1 that maximize the formula (3) in phase 1, a1≥a is the constraints condition. When the interior point 
solution exists, the first order conditions are: 
∂V/∂ a1=-f(π*-a1)U(a1,w1,a,w*2)+F(π*-a1)Ua1(a1,w1,a, w*2)+f(π*-a1)U(a1,w1,a, wH) 
              +[1-F(π*-a1)]Ua1 (a1,w1,a, wH)=0                                                                                       (4) 
When such a solution is only one, a*1=r(w1, w*2, a, wH), there is the following formula 
                                                   a1 =max{ a*1,a}                                                                                (5)  
a1 of formula (5) is the efforts level that enterprises selecting in phase 1. Let's analyze that w1ˈw*2ˈ
wH  and π* how to  affect  the optimal choice  a1 then. In the formula (2), contract dose not directly  give π* 
but provide P, by which to decide π*. It is assumed that there is many enough enterprises  in the region, 
namely n is large enough that single enterprise not considering influence of their choice on effo rts level of 
energy-saving and emission reduction to π*.The enterprise will think π*as given in selecting a1, P by 
formula (2) will in turn affect the efforts level of enterprises’ energy-saving and emission reduction; other 
variables such as w1,wL and wH are also similar. It is assumed that the utility function U has the property 
of time additive and separable, that is, 
U(a1,w1,a,wH)=U’(a1,w1)+U2(a, wH)                                                                   (6) 
It may been known from the formula (4) that a*1 meeting the following equation  
                                          V1=∂ v(a1,w1, w*2,wH, π*)/∂ a1=0                                                                     (7) 
∂a1*/∂x=-(∂v1/∂x)/( ∂v1/∂a1) can be gain according to implicit function theorems and formulas (7), x 
may be any variable among w1ˈw*2ˈwH  and π*.,then P will be used to replace π*. The follow formula 
can be gain according to the formula (4) and formula (7) . 
V1=-f(π*-a1)[U2(a,wH)- U2(a, w*2)]+ F(π*-a1)U’a1+[1-F(π*-a1)]U’a1 
                             =f(h(P))[ U2(a, wH)- U2(a, w*2)]+ U’a1 (a1,w1)                                                          (8) 
The follow formula can be gain according to the formula (2) ,formula (4) and formula (8). 
∂a1*/∂w1=∂r/∂w1=-(∂V1/∂w1)/( ∂v1/∂a1)=- (∂U’/∂w1)/( ∂U’/∂a1)=-U12/U11                                                    (9)  
(∂a1*/∂w1=-U12/U11≥0, U12≥0; ∂a1*/∂w1=-U12/U11 <0, U12<0 )   
∂a1*/∂w2*=∂r/∂w2*=-(∂V1/∂w2*)/(∂v1/∂a1)=+f(a*-a1)U4/U11<0  (10) 
The value of U4 can be gain from w*2 
         ∂a1*/∂wH=∂r/∂H=--f(π*-a1) U4/U11>0                                                     (11) 
The value of U4 can be gain from wH 
   ∂a1*/∂P=∂r/∂H=(-f(π*-a1)((dπ*-da1)/dP)(U2(a,wH)-U2(a, w2*))/U11                                                 (12)   
∂a1*/∂P≥0, if f’(π*-a1)İ0˗∂a1*/∂P<0, if f’(π*-a1)>0˗ 
It is assumed to wH> w*2, and if wH=w*2, then ∂a1*/∂P=0 
3. Analysis of incentive mechanism model on enterprises’ energy-saving and emission reduction 
3.1 Analysis of incentive mechanism model 
Formula (9) means that U12=0 and ∂a1*/∂w1=0 will be gain when the effect and the effort level in the 
utility function being additive. Apparently w1 isn’t affected by a*1; Formula (10) ∂a1*/∂w2*<0 means that 
the increase of retain support or subsidies w and low subsidies or support wL in phase 2 will reduce the 
optimal efforts levels of energy-saving and emission reduction; Formula (11) ∂a1*/∂wH>0 means that the 
support or subsidy wH special cared the higher, the effort  of enterprise’ engaging in  energy-saving and 
emission reduction the more; Formula  (12) means that enterprises’ response is not monotonous  to the 
percentage P special cared and supported by the government. When the percentage special cared and 
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supported lead to f’(π*-a1)<0, a*1 rise accompanied by P rise, which means that the possibility special 
cared and supported by the government the larger the effort of enterprise’ engaging in energy-saving and 
emission reduction the more. But  when the percentage special cared and supported beyond certain 
declining critical point, we know that π*-a1 be small enough by the formula (2), f’(π*-a1)will normally be 
more than zero, a*1  decrease accompanied by P rise. The means of above analysis is that: the excessive 
higher or lower reward proportion will not mobilize the enthusiasm of enterprises engag ing in energy-
saving and emission reduction. 
3.2 Government (social) return produced by enterprises’ energy-saving and emission reduction  
Government can not simply consider the economic benefits , but also considering the environmental 
and social benefits  in the process of regulating social and economic development. If each enterprise 
within  the region is committed to energy-saving and emission reduction, on the one hand, which can 
increase the energy efficiency and reduce carbon dioxide emissions to achieve good environmental 
benefits; the other hand, which  can promote enterprises to technology innovation and improve production 
efficiency to achieve good economic returns? Energy-saving and emission reduction can increase income 
levels across the whole reg ion, reflected such as the form of the environmental benefits and taxes. 
Therefore, the government revenue here referring means that an enterprise energy saving benefits to the 
entire region (including the environmental and economic benefits) minus the balance of government 
subsidies. The government’s expecting revenue from each enterprise are: 
π(w1,wL, wH,P)=h(w1,wL, wH,P)-w1+β(a-PwH-(1-P)wL),if wL≥w  
   π(w1,wL, wH,P)=h(w1,wL, wH,P)-w1+βP(a-wH),if wL< w                                         (13) 
Among formula (13): a*1=h(w1,wL,wH,P), β is the enterprise's discount factor. The problem of the 
government becomes that how to choose (w1,wL,wH,P) for making expected profit π(w1,wL,wH,P) 
maximization, and for meeting U≥Ūand 0≤P≤1. In real life, the government is representative of the whole 
region interests, as long as the payments balance may be maintained (environmental benefits can translate 
into economic benefits), the rank order tournament can be implemented. Therefore, for making 
π(w1,wL,wH,P)≥0 on choosing (w1,wL,wH,P), the government can implement  the rank order tournament.Of 
course, the government can choose 1 -phase fixed subsidy contracts. The efforts level o f enterprise’s 
energy-saving and emission reduction in two phases within the region is a, the Government expected 
profit is: 
                                             π(w1,w2)=a-w1+β (a-w2), w2≥w ; π(w1,w2)=a-w1, w2< w                             (14) 
This contract is equivalent to the situation of P=0 in 2-phase contract. The 2-phase contract must be 
better than the contract. The optimal 2-phase contract will be strictly better than the fixed support or 
subsidy contracts when expected return selecting 0<P<1 is greater than expected return of P=0. The 
expected return of 2 -phase contract will be strictly g reater than the expected return of the fixed support or 
subsidy contracts (0<P<1,wH>w2*) as long as the marginal ut ility U4 of income obtaining from energy-
saving and emission reduction in the second phase is greater than the marginal utility change rate U11 of 
energy-saving and emission reduction in the first phase. In other words, according the comparative static 
analysis of enterprises’ optimization phenomenon, -U4/U11will decide that a1 how to rise with the wH 
increase for any 0<P<1 given.  If-U4/U11 is large enough, the increase of a1 (then π1) will be able to make 
up for cost wH-w2*) of additional support or subsidies  supplied by the government. 
4. Conclusion 
According to the construction and analysis on incentives mechanism models of enterprises’ energy-
saving and emission reduction, some notion matters can be deduced:Ł The central government should 
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increase the intensity of financial transfer payments to support local energy-saving and emission 
reduction, should allocate special funds for promoting energy-saving and emission reductionłThe local 
government should set up a special incentive fund of energy saving and emission reduction and 
implement financial budget management, the environmental subjects should been established in the 
expenditures subject of local financial budget, the funds should been special charged to support 
enterprises’ technology innovation on energy-saving and emission reduction and the use of renewable 
energy.ŃThe local governments should construct hierarchical policy support or financial subsidies  which 
to form the ladder-like support structure, should special support a small number of enterprises with better 
energy-saving and emission reduction effect within the region. ńThe local government should establish a 
evaluation criteria  of incentive that according to the efforts level of implementing energy-saving and 
emission reduction activity rather than enterprise’s operating size, profitability and enterprise 
qualification within the region. The enterprise with better energy-saving and emission reduction effect 
should been special supported and cared in such policies as finance, taxation, procurement, cred it by the 
local government.  
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